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Abstract
Recent studies have shown that information dis-
closed on social network sites (such as Facebook)
can be used to predict personal characteristics
with surprisingly high accuracy. In this paper
we examine a method to give online users trans-
parency into why certain inferences are made
about them by statistical models, and control to
inhibit those inferences by hiding (“cloaking”)
certain personal information from inference. We
use this method to examine whether such trans-
parency and control would be a reasonable goal
by assessing how difficult it would be for users to
actually inhibit inferences. Applying the method
to data from a large collection of real users
on Facebook, we show that a user must cloak
only a small portion of her Facebook Likes in
order to inhibit inferences about their personal
characteristics. However, we also show that in
response a firm could change its modeling of
users to make cloaking more difficult.
1. Introduction
Successful pricing strategies as well as marketing and po-
litical campaigns depend on the ability to target consumers
or voters accurately. This generates incentives to acquire
and exploit information about personal characteristics such
as gender, marital status, religion, and sexual or political
orientation. Personal characteristics are often hard to
observe because of lack of data or privacy restrictions. As
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a result, firms and governments increasingly depend on
statistical inferences drawn from available information.
Online user targeting systems increasingly are trained using
information on users’ fine-grained behaviors (Perlich et al.,
2013). A growing trend is to base targeting on information
disclosed by users on social networks. For instance,
Facebook has recently deployed a system that allows third
party applications to display ads on their platform using
their user’s profile information, such as the things they
indicate that they “Like.”12
While some individuals may benefit from being targeted
based on inferences of their personal characteristics, others
may find such inferences unsettling. These inferences may
be incorrect due to a lack of data, inadequate models, or
simply the probabilistic nature of the inference. Moreover,
some users may not wish to have certain personal char-
acteristics inferred at all. To many, privacy invasions via
statistical inferences are at least as troublesome as privacy
invasions based on revealing personal data (Barocas, 2014).
However, social networks such as Facebook lack features
that allow for transparency and fine-grained control over
how users’ profiles and behavioral information are used to
determine targeted content and advertisements.
Transparency is based on understanding the reasons for
data-driven inferences. We ask: what is the minimal
set of evidence such that, if it had not been present, an
inference about a user would not have been drawn? We
introduce the idea of a “cloaking device” as a vehicle to
offer users control over inferences, and we show that a
user needs to only cloak a small portion of her Likes in
1https://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/2014/10/07/audience-
network
2We will capitalize “Like” when referring to the action or its
result on Facebook.
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order to inhibit inference, based on the modeling presented
by (Kosinski et al., 2013).
2. Privacy, Cloakability, and the Evidence
Counterfactual
Online privacy is becoming an increasing concern for con-
sumers, regulators and policy makers (White House, 2012).
The analytics literature has traditionally focused on the
issue of privacy of personal information (see (Smith et al.,
2011; Pavlou, 2011) for an overview). However, with the
rapid increase in the amount of social media data avail-
able, statistical inference about personal characteristics
is a growing concern (Barocas, 2014; Gayo-Avello et al.,
2013). A series of papers have shown the predictive power
of information disclosed on Facebook to infer users’ per-
sonal characteristics (Kosinski et al., 2013; Bachrach et al.,
2012; Schwartz et al., 2013). A recent study based on a sur-
vey of Facebook users found that users do not feel that they
have the appropriate tools to mitigate their privacy concerns
when it comes to social network data (Johnson et al., 2012).
The method we propose to provide transparency over
inferences is based on the idea of explaining individual
model predictions by examining the “evidence” in the input
feature vectors that, if removed, would lead the model
not to make the prediction (introduced in the context of
data-driven document classifications (Martens & Provost,
2014)). As a shorthand, we refer to this counterfactual
notion of “what would the model have done if this evidence
hadn’t been present” as an “evidence counterfactual.” The
prior work can be generalized directly to any domain where
the features taken as input can be seen as interpretable
pieces of evidence for or against a particular non-default
inference.3 Figure 1 illustrates the case of two users,
their probabilities of being gay as predicted by the infer-
ence procedure of (Kosinski et al., 2013), and the effect
of removing evidence from their data. As evidence is
removed by cloaking Likes, we see that removing fewer
than ten Likes for one user results in a dramatic drop in
the predicted probability of being gay, whereas for the
other user, removing the same number of Likes reduces the
probability hardly at all. This motivating example leads us
to propose a general method of cloaking.
2.1. A Model for Cloaking
We will now formally describe cloaking in the context
of a linear model (for extension to non-linear models,
follow (Martens & Provost, 2014)). Consider predictions
3The explanation for a default prediction—namely, that there
is no evidence for any alternative—often will be viewed as
either trivial or unsatisfying. See (Martens & Provost, 2014) for
further discussion and other nuances of explaining model-based
inferences.
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Figure 1. The predicted probability of being gay as a function of
Like cloaking for two users. For each line, the leftmost point is the
estimated probability of being gay for the user before cloaking.
Moving left to right, for each user, Likes are removed one-by-
one from consideration by the inference procedure in order of
greatest effect on the estimated score. One user’s probability
drops dramatically after cloaking fewer than ten Likes; the other’s
is hardly affected at all.
of personal traits based on binary Likes as features. Let
βj be the coefficient associated with Like j ∈ {1; ...; J}.
Without loss of generality, assume that these are ranked by
decreasing value of β. Each such coefficient corresponds
to the marginal increase in a user’s score if he chooses to
Like j. For a target trait s, let si be the model output score
for user i, calculated as
∑J
j=1 βjxij where xij is set to
1 if user i has Liked j and zero otherwise. We consider
“targeted” users to be those in the top δ-quantile of the
score distribution. Define the cutoff score sδ to be the score
of the highest-ranked user in the quantile directly below
the targeted users. Thus the set of targeted users Ts for
classification task s is Ts = {i | si > sδ}.
To analyze the difficulty or ease of cloaking for each user
in the targeted group, we iteratively remove Likes from his
profile in order of the largest effect on the output score.
A user is considered to be successfully cloaked when his
score falls below sδ (and thus he no longer would be
targeted). Given a linear model, the Like with the largest
effect on the output score is the Like present in the user’s
data instance that has the largest coefficient in the model.
For each user and trait the model is static; models are
not retrained after each Like is removed. Figure 1 shows
two examples. The absolute effort to cloak a particular
classification target s for user i, ηsi,δ, is given by counting
the number of Likes that must be removed for that user
to drop below the threshold score. The (average) absolute
effort to cloak characteristic s is given by averaging across
users in Ts,22
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ηsδ =
∑
i∈Ts
ηsi,δ
|Ts|
. (1)
For the rest of this paper we use δ = 0.90 to indicate that
the top 10% of users are being targeted. For other values of
δ the results hold qualitatively.
3. Results
Let us now examine the effort required to cloak the infer-
ences of a variety of personal characteristics based on data
on Facebook users. We first describe the data, and then
assess the effort required to cloak user characteristics.
3.1. Data
Our data were collected through a Facebook application
called myPersonality.4 Users of the application have opted
in and given their consent to have their data recorded for
analysis. The data comprise 164, 883 individuals from
the United States, including their responses to survey
questions and a subset of their Facebook profiles, including
Likes. Subsets of users are characterized by their sexual
orientation, gender, political affiliation, religious views,
IQ, alcohol and drug use, personality dimensions, and
lifestyle choices. The personal characteristics are the target
variables for the various modeling and inference problems
and the Likes are the features. The feature data are very
sparse: a user displays less than 0.5% of the set of Likes on
average. Table 1 presents summary statistics.
We replicated the predictive modeling and inference pro-
cedure reported by (Kosinski et al., 2013). Specifically, we
build the predictive models on the top 100 SVD compo-
nents using logistic regression as implemented in the scikit-
learn package in Python (LRSVD). For each model, we
choose the regularization parameter by 5-fold nested cross-
validation (Provost & Fawcett, 2013).
3.2. Cloaking Difficulty
Table 2 reports the effort necessary to cloak users in the top
10% of users as ranked by model score. Column 1 shows
that although users display hundreds of Likes, on average
they need to cloak less than 10 of them to successfully
inhibit inference. This corresponds to cloaking only about
2 − 3% of a user’s Likes, on average. The averages give a
fair picture: with only a couple exceptions the proportion
of information needed to inhibit inference is around 2−4%.
To put these results in context it would be useful to
know how strongly the cloakability of a trait is related to
4Thanks to the authors of (Kosinski et al., 2013) for sharing
the data.
Task # Users % Positive Avg. Likes
age ≥ 37 145,400 0.127 216
agreeableness ≥ 5 136,974 0.014 218
conscientiousness ≥ 5 136,974 0.018 218
extraversion ≥ 5 136,974 0.033 218
iq ≥ 130 4,540 0.130 186
iq < 90 4,540 0.073 186
is democrat 7,301 0.596 262
is drinking 3,351 0.485 262
is female 164,285 0.616 209
is gay 22,383 0.046 192
is homosexual 51,703 0.035 257
is lesbian 29,320 0.027 307
is muslim 11,600 0.050 238
is single 124,863 0.535 226
is smoking 3,376 0.237 261
life satisfaction ≥ 6 5,958 0.125 252
network density ≥ 65 32,704 0.012 214
neuroticism ≥ 5 136,974 0.004 218
num friends ≥ 585 32,704 0.140 214
openness ≥ 5 136,974 0.043 218
ss belief = 1 13,900 0.178 229
ss belief = 5 13,900 0.079 229
uses drugs 2,490 0.172 264
Table 1. Summary statistics of the dataset. Number of Users
indicates how many unique users are associated with the given
task. Percent positive shows the percentage of users with true
labels for each task. Average Likes indicates the average number
of Likes a user associated with the given task has.
the statistical dependency structure of the data-generating
process. One might think that people who indeed hold a
particular trait would exhibit it throughout their behavior,
and in particular throughout the things that they Like. How
do these cloakability results compare to what one would
expect if Likes and the trait were not actually interrelated?
Figure 3 shows the difference between η0.9 in the no-
dependency population and the true η0.9. Additional details
on this test can be found in the extended working paper
(Chen et al., 2015).
Although it is indeed relatively easy to inhibit inference
by cloaking Likes, the statistical dependencies among the
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Figure 2. Difference in cloaking, η0.9, for true positive and false
positive users using the LRSVD model. Error bars depict the 95%
confidence interval.
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Figure 3. Comparison between absolute effort (η0.9) to cloak in
the LRSVD model. Results from the normal cloaking procedure
are compared to those of a randomization test for each task. Error
bars depict the 95% confidence interval.
Likes and the predicted trait makes it more difficult than it
would be without such dependencies.
3.3. Cloaking True Positives vs. False Positives
There are multiple settings where one might want to in-
hibit inference. Possibly the most important distinction is
between inhibiting an inference that is in fact true (a true
positive inference) and inhibiting an inference that is false
(a false positive inference). Based on the prior results, one
might expect that a false positive inference would be easier
to cloak because the statistical dependency to the (positive)
trait is by definition missing. The false positive user was
“accidentally” classified as positive, similarly to how the
top-decile randomized users “accidentally” were classified.
In neither case was the presence of the trait reflected in the
behavior of the user. For a more detailed discussion see the
working paper (Chen et al., 2015).
In table 2, we show that cloaking is indeed generally more
difficult for true-positive users than for false-positive (p <
0.05, sign test). The differences in cloakability between
true-positive and false-positive users are shown in figure 2.
3.4. Modeling Behavior
Table 3 presents the values for our cloaking measure
across different models.5 As expected, the cloaking effort
required for the LR and LRSVD models are similar. In
contrast, cloaking is indeed substantially more difficult for
NB. Rather than needing to cloak only a half-dozen or so
Likes in the LR and LRSVD models, the NB model’s users
on average have to cloak 50 Likes.
Mechanically, we can explain this difference through the
5The generalization performance for the NB model is slightly
lower than that for the logistic regression models.
Table 2. The effort necessary to cloak different users’ character-
istics using the logistic regression with the 100-SVD-component
logistic regression (LRSVD) model. The first column shows the
full set of users; the second column shows only the true positive
users, and the third column shows only the false positive users.
η0.9
Task All TP FP
is lesbian 3.075 5.437 2.829
is homosexual 3.493 6.572 2.888
extraversion ≥ 5 4.428 5.944 4.300
conscientiousness ≥ 5 4.746 6.746 4.670
agreeableness ≥ 5 4.985 6.508 4.957
num friends ≥ 585 5.043 6.556 4.197
life satisfaction ≥ 6 5.128 7.214 4.642
is gay 5.653 10.944 3.161
ss belief = 1 5.738 6.880 4.946
iq ≥ 130 6.566 3.429 7.283
openness ≥ 5 6.674 7.677 6.571
is drinking 6.771 7.463 3.875
iq < 90 6.867 16.318 4.582
ss belief = 5 8.251 11.098 7.760
is smoking 8.357 9.800 5.621
is democrat 8.462 8.533 2.000
neuroticism ≥ 5 9.140 5.667 9.173
is female 9.971 10.015 5.475
age ≥ 37 10.259 13.011 5.847
network density ≥ 65 10.545 15.308 10.388
is muslim 11.706 27.804 2.930
uses drugs 12.161 12.143 12.176
is single 13.665 15.514 7.888
Mean 7.465 9.851 5.572
assumptions made by each of the predictive models. The
main different between the LR/LRSVD models and the
NB model is that the NB algorithm treats Likes as if
they are conditionally independent of each other given
the target (the trait). When the Likes in fact are highly
correlated, this creates a pathology in predictive behavior:
the resulting inference model will tend to “double count”
when users present correlated Likes. This result indicates
that a targeter could choose to make cloaking more difficult
without imposing any restrictions on their users simply by
changing its predictive model choice (possibly incurring a
small loss in predictive performance.)
4. Conclusion
The results show that the amount of effort users must exert
in order to successfully hide themselves is quite small.
Although it is higher than if there were no statistical de-
pendency among the Likes and the personal traits, the users
still need only to cloak about a half-dozen of their hundreds
of Likes on average to inhibit inference of a personal trait.
Users for whom the inference made is actually wrong
have an even easier time cloaking the inference. However,
organizations engaging in such modeling could alter their
modeling choices to make cloaking much more difficult.
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Table 3. The effort to cloak different users’ characteristics using
logistic regression with 100 SVD components (LRSVD), logistic
regression on the raw Likes (LR), and naive Bayes (NB).
η0.9
Task LRSVD LR NB
is lesbian 3.075 2.507 15.518
is homosexual 3.493 3.396 17.046
extraversion ≥ 5 4.428 3.617 58.048
conscientiousness ≥ 5 4.746 3.357 24.471
agreeableness ≥ 5 4.985 2.871 8.727
num friends ≥ 585 5.043 4.748 57.596
life satisfaction ≥ 6 5.128 4.061 11.959
is gay 5.653 9.073 17.796
ss belief = 1 5.738 4.550 19.908
iq ≥ 130 6.566 2.920 21.947
openness ≥ 5 6.674 3.700 37.433
is drinking 6.771 5.398 17.687
iq < 90 6.867 3.681 7.664
ss belief = 5 8.251 4.692 25.450
is smoking 8.357 7.012 44.821
is democrat 8.462 9.396 65.363
neuroticism ≥ 5 9.140 2.292 125.232
is female 9.971 11.619 320.665
age ≥ 37 10.259 7.263 37.746
network density ≥ 65 10.545 2.569 75.717
is muslim 11.706 8.934 31.131
uses drugs 12.161 8.161 20.532
is single 13.665 10.233 101.658
Mean 7.465 5.48 50.614
These results raise the question of whether organizations
would want to give users such transparency and control.
One argument is that a firm should because, in line with
other “fair information practices” it simply is the right
thing to do. As certain firms become indispensable,
individuals would pay a heavy social cost simply to opt
out. An alternative argument is that doing so would
increase customer satisfaction, and few people would ac-
tually exercise their option for control. In 2014, Facebook
introduced a feature called “Why am I seeing this ad?”
which gives users partial transparency into why they are
being targeted. Users can also selectively cloak particular
categories of ads or advertisers; they can also modify
their “ad preferences” to hide categories of information
from being used for targeting. Transparency would be
greatly enhanced by revealing which data actually led to
the provision of particular content or ads, as well as tools
to help users to cloak just the right data.
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